Competitiveness pervades life: plants compete for sunlight and water, animals for territory and food, and humans for mates and income. Herein we investigate human competitiveness with a natural experiment and a set of behavioral experiments. We compare competitiveness in traditional fishing societies where local natural forces determine whether fishermen work in isolation or in collectives. We find sharp evidence that fishermen from individualistic societies are far more competitive than fishermen from collectivistic societies, and that this difference emerges with work experience. These findings suggest that humans can evolve traits to specific needs, support the idea that socio-ecological factors play a decisive role for individual competitiveness, and provide evidence how individualistic and collectivistic societies shape economic behavior.
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endogeneous preferences | social learning | field experiment I ndividuals frequently face a decision that can affect their wellbeing and even survival: to compete or not to compete. Natural and social scientists argue that competitions and the right dose of competitiveness significantly determine not only the future of the individual but even the evolution of the whole species (1, 2) . However, behavioral experiments with humans show that there are large differences in competitiveness between individuals that cannot be readily explained by genetic endowments, abilities, or risk attitudes (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) .
A possible explanation of the large variations in human competitiveness is based on learning theories. Observational learning describes individuals' tendency to adapt by imitating successful behavior. Social or cultural learning models attribute an important role to individual experiences in the social and physical environments for the formation of traits and norms (10) (11) (12) (13) . Thus, individual variations in competitiveness may be the result of exposure to different environments and pressures.
In this study we investigate how local natural forces cause human competitiveness to change. We compare competitiveness in geographically proximate individualistic and collectivistic fishing societies with experiments. Our key exogenous variation is whether fishermen spend their lives at a lake or at the sea. The main difference between these societies is that the sea ecology favors fishermen to work in collectives, whereas the lake ecology guides them to fish in isolation. As a result, the output of the fishermen in the individualistic lake societies should depend on their willingness to compete with other fishermen for the best fishing spots, the best sales, and the most beneficial trade relations, whereas such individual competitiveness is unnecessary in the collectivistic sea societies. We hypothesize that these differences result in changes in individual competitiveness and that lake fishermen become more competitive than sea fishermen with exposure to these local pressures.
The experiments we used in the field facilitated comparisons and control of causal factors (14) . Fishermen at the sea and at a nearby lake took part in experiments in which we measured their propensity to compete for high monetary stakes. We chose a task that was simple and unfamiliar to the subjects to capture competition preferences. The task was to throw a tennis ball 10 times into a bucket that was set 3 m away. Competitiveness was identified by a single choice: subjects decided, before performing the task, whether they wanted to compete. They were informed that if they decided not to compete they would earn one monetary unit per successful attempt. If they decided to compete they would earn three monetary units per successful attempt, but only if they outperformed one unknown other subject; if they scored less than this other subject they would not earn anything. In case of a tie they would earn one monetary unit per successful attempt. Subjects could earn more than an average 2-d's salary in the competition experiment. They did not know against whom they were to compete, and to rule out fairness or other social considerations, their decision whether to enter into competition could not affect another subject's payoff; i.e., nobody could be dragged into competition. More information on experimental procedures is reported in the SI Text.
We selected eight small traditional individualistic and three collectivistic fishing societies in Brazil (Fig. 1 ) that are in close geographical proximity to measure individual competitiveness. As mentioned above, the main difference between these societies was that fishermen located on the lake worked on their own in small boats, but at the sea fishermen worked on larger boats in teams (28.6% go fishing in teams of two, 35.7% in teams of three, and the remaining 35.7% in teams of four to eight individuals). Thus, as mentioned above, although fishermen at the lake spend much of their lives in isolation competing against other fishermen on the lake and fish markets (15) , fishermen at the sea are together with their team members and do not compete against other individuals.
As can be seen in Fig. 1 , the lake is connected to the sea by a river, only divided by a dam. The air-line distance between the lake and sea is ∼50 km, which roughly corresponds to the distance between the west and the east side of the lake. Despite the geographical proximity, we found no evidence for migration between individualistic and collectivistic societies, and did not meet a single fisherman who moved from one setting to the other or went fishing in both settings. Immigration and emigration occur to some limited extent at the individualistic lake setting and we tested for their roles subsequently.
On average our subjects were 38.2 y (±13.3 SD, n = 289), lived for 28.3 y (±15.8 SD, n = 289) in the same fishing society, and had worked for 18.4 y (±12.4 SD, n = 289, variable = work experience) professionally as fishermen. In both settings, fishermen work for most of the year, and for 5 to 7 d a week. They are heavily dependent on the shrimp and fish resources: there are very few other types of jobs in these societies, and fishing is often the only possible profession to provide fishermen and their families with income and nutrition. Fishermen from both the individualistic and collectivistic societies are similarly educated (mean years in school = 3.45; Mann-Whitney U test, z = 0.813, P = 0.416, two-sided, n = 287) and generate equal incomes from fishing (monthly mean = 248.34 Brazilian Reais, Mann-Whitney U test, z = 0.359, P = 0.720, twosided, n = 289).
Our first finding shows that individual competitiveness is more important in individualistic than in collectivistic societies. We observe that incomes from fishing and fishermen's individual competitiveness measured by the competition experiment are positively correlated at the lake in the individualistic societies (Pearson's, r = 0.227, P = 0.0016, n = 191). The lake fishermen who chose to compete in our experiment earn on average almost 50% more than those who chose not to compete (300.3 vs. 212.9 Brazilian Reais, Mann-Whitney U test, z = 3.246, P = 0.0012, two-sided, n = 191). There is no such comparable relationship in the collectivistic societies (252.2 vs. 235.1, Pearson's, r = 0.047, P = 0.641, n = 98).
Our second finding confirms our hypothesis that fishermen in the individualistic societies are more competitive than those in the collectivistic societies: 45.6% of the lake fishermen chose to compete, compared with only 27.6% of the sea fishermen (Fisher's exact test, P = 0.003, two-sided, n = 289). Fishermen who work in isolation were on average approximately 65% more willing to compete in the experiment than fishermen who work in collectives.
Our third finding is that the gap between individualistic and collectivistic societies in individual competitiveness emerges with exposure to the lake and sea ecology. Fig. 2 illustrates a linear estimation of the probability of competing for fishermen in the individualistic and collectivistic societies depending on work experience. First, we can see that both lines are initially very close to each other, but then significantly disperse. Second, and in line with our hypothesis, we observe that the solid line for the lake fishermen increases, whereas the dashed line for the sea fishermen decreases with work experience. The confidence intervals illustrate that the lake-sea gap in competitiveness becomes significant with ∼17 y of work experience. Thus, there are particularly large differences in competitiveness for experienced fishermen. For example, in the sample of fishermen who have worked for at least 20 y, we observed that lake fishermen were approximately 2.6-times more likely to compete than sea fishermen (54.4% vs. 21.3%, Fisher's exact test, P < 0.0001, two-sided, n = 115). The interaction between society and work experience is significant at P = 0.019 in a Probit model (n = 289) and robust to the inclusion of control variables, as we show in the SI Text.
It is hard to explain the different drifts in competitiveness between the societies by genetic endowments, but other factors could play a role, such as differential abilities (to throw the ball), risk differences across societies (16), or immigration into and emigration out of societies. To test for the effect of these additional factors, we used data from these societies on abilities, risk preferences, immigration and emigration.
This additional data suggests that none of these alternative explanations is consistent with the primary data. First, task proficiencies in the competition experiment are unrelated to work experience in individualistic or collectivistic societies (Pearson's, P > 0.188), and controlling for successful attempts does not affect the impact of society on competitiveness. Second, risk preferences identified in a lottery experiment are also unrelated to work experience in individualistic and collectivistic societies (Pearson's, P > 0.32) and controlling for lottery investments does not affect the impact of society on competitiveness. Third, fishermen who did or did not immigrate into the lake society were not differently competitive (43.9% vs. 46%, Fisher's exact test, P = 0.861, twosided, n = 191) and fishermen who did or did not emigrate out of the lake society or stopped fishing were also not differently competitive (39.5% vs. 46.2%, Fisher exact test, P = 0.579, two-sided, n = 170). Thus, immigration and emigration cannot drive the changes in competitiveness in the individualistic and collectivistic societies. Another potential driver is the differences in individualistic and collectivistic societies other than local natural forces affecting the manner in which members generate their living. To test for such other potentially unobservable differences, we conducted two additional competition experiments. First, we conducted the same competition experiments with women living in the individualistic and collectivistic societies who do not fish and are thus not differently affected by local natural forces. Second, we conducted group competition experiments with fishermen at the lake and sea to test whether there are differences in group competitiveness (17, 18). Because group-in contrast to individual-competitiveness is not crucial at the lake, we hypothesized that we should observe that group competitiveness is not more pronounced at the lake than at the sea. The task, choice, and parameters were identical to the individual group competition experiment. The only difference was that participants were told that they could either be paid depending on their own and an unknown partner's performance if they decided to not compete or by their pair performance relative to another pair if they decided to compete.
The additional competition experiments suggest that society differences other than differential local natural forces are not responsible for the findings, as we found no differences at the lake and sea in women's competitiveness and fishermen's group competitiveness. Women in the individualistic societies who do not fish were as competitive as women in the collectivistic societies who do not fish (15% vs. 14.7%, Fisher's exact test, P = 1, n = 66), suggesting that traits that evolve at work do not easily spread to other society members. Furthermore, fishermen in the individualistic societies were similarly likely to enter into group competitions as fishermen in the collectivistic societies (36% vs. 35.8%, Fisher's exact test, P = 1, n = 103).
By combining a unique spatial feature affecting living patterns with experiments in the field, we are able to gain insights into the underpinnings of human competitiveness. Our results show that local work experience resulting from different technologies and socio-ecological factors can have an important impact on the shaping of competitiveness. We find that competitiveness changes with exposure to local forces: in the individualistic society where nature constrains humans to work in isolation, individuals become considerably more competitive, whereas the opposite holds in the collectivistic society where there is teamwork.
Our findings may also provide evidence in favor of endogenous preference formation (19, 20) and highlight that natural pressures can have a large impact on norms of competition. Finally, our study informs the literature that has investigated the relationships between individualism, collectivism, and economic outcomes (21-28) and the role of the social environment for human traits (29-33).
Methods
Subjects. A total of 458 subjects, aged 18-87, from traditional fishing societies at a lake and at the sea gave their consent to participate in this research, which took place in the state of Bahia in Brazil. The experiments were conducted in several individualistic (lake) and collectivistic (sea) societies. The main difference between the lake and sea societies is whether fishermen fish alone or in collectives. Fishermen at the sea fish in collectives because the sea ecology constrains them to use fishing instruments, such as large and heavy fishnets, that can be only handled by more than one person. For fishermen at the lake, however, it is not necessary to work in collectives because the lake ecology renders it possible to use fishing instruments that can be handled by one person. Fishermen at the lake compete against other fishermen for the best fishing spots, selling prices, and trade relations, but such individual competition is largely absent at the sea setting.
Experimental Procedures. In each experimental session, participants first received an identification code. Then, experimenters led each participant one by one to a separate place and explained the rules of the competition game verbally in detail and in private to the participants. We ensured that the participants who waited for their turn did not talk to others. All decisions were blind to other participants; that is, we never told participants the choices of another participant and behavior (ball throwing) in the competition game could not be observed. Participants earned a considerable amount of money during the experiments, typically more than their daily incomes. For more detail on the experimental procedures, see the SI Text. 
SI Methods
In the first section of the SI Text, we provide additional information for the interested reader on the experimental design, the field setting, and the experimental procedures and instructions.
Experimental Design. The aim of this study was to investigate whether local natural forces drive human competitiveness by dictating of different work societies. Our hypothesis is that individual competitiveness is more pronounced in individualistic than in collectivistic societies. In addition, we hypothesize that a society gap in competitiveness emerges with work experience. These hypotheses are based on the assumption that individual competitiveness is more important in individualistic than in collectivistic societies, and that individuals learn to adapt to local natural pressures. For this reason, we selected a field setting where individuals are strongly, directly, but differentially exposed to local forces of nature, resulting in different work societies, and used behavioral experiments to measure competitiveness. Our subject pool consisted of professional, small-scale fishermen who live off fishing. This subject pool is well-suited for our aim because the studied individuals all follow the same profession but their organization of work systematically differs, and this difference is caused by local natural forces: one part of our subject pool comes from a society at the sea where the ecology constrains fishermen to work in collectives, whereas the other part comes from a society at a nearby lake where fishermen work in isolation. We assume that individual competitiveness is more important in the individualistic than in the collectivistic society because fishermen in the individualistic society need to compete individually against other fishermen for the best fishing spots, sales, and trade relationships to generate incomes (whereas no such individual competition is present at the sea).
We also decided to investigate fishermen from geographically proximate societies to facilitate comparisons and avoid problems that may arise when studying behavior in societies/cultures that are more distant, speak different languages, or are located in different countries. First, we did not have to translate instructions into different languages. All instructions were in Portuguese. Second, we could use the same currency in both societies (Brazilian Reais). Because participants from both societies were approximately equally wealthy, the monetary value of the experimental currency was identical. Finally, we could use the same experimenters for both societies. We did not observe differences in ethnic composition across our societies.
Field Setting. The field setting is located in the north-east of Brazil in the state of Bahia. The studied lake is called the "Lago Pedra do Cavalo," the river that connects the lake to the sea is the "Rio Paraguacu," and the sea setting is at the "Baia de todos os Santos." For other research at the lake setting see refs 1-3. Figs. S1-S4 provide impressions of the field setting and the experimental sessions. We selected several individualistic and collectivistic societies in which fishing is the main source of income. We found three collectivistic societies at the estuary mouth of the river that connects the sea to the lake. At the lake, we found eight individualistic societies.
Although the air-line distance between the lake and sea setting is only ∼50 km (which roughly corresponds to the distance between the west and east side of the lake), we found no evidence for migration between the lake and sea; that is, we did not meet a single fisherman who moved from one setting to the other or who fished in both settings. The large majority of fishermen have never even visited the other field setting because traveling from one setting to the other is difficult and time-consuming.
There is some evidence suggesting migration between lake fishing societies. We observed in our surveys that 21.5% of the lake fishermen in our sample moved into one of the lake fishing societies after they had already started fishing. Although we did not ask where they lived before, informal discussions suggest that most lived before in a neighboring society. We observed little migration between/into sea fishing societies (4.1%), likely because the societies are more distant from each other than at the lake. There is also some evidence suggesting migration out of lake fishing societies. We asked during our experimental sessions in 2012 whether fishermen from the 2008 experimental sessions were still living in the village and whether they were still fishing professionally. Of the lake fishermen from 2008, 22.4% had either moved out of the village or stopped fishing. At the sea, we observed that in 2012, 13.2% of the fishermen from 2008 had either moved out of the village or stopped fishing.
The major difference between the societies at the lake and at the sea is whether fishermen go fishing alone or in collectives. At our lake setting, fishermen can and typically go fishing alone, whereas at our sea setting, they can fish only in collectives, typically with unrelated others. Fishermen at our sea setting use fishing instruments that can only be handled by more than one person (typically long and heavy fishnets), and they therefore also use larger fishing boats. Note also that even if fishermen wanted to go fishing alone they are not allowed to. Fishing alone at the sea is legally prohibited (it has led to fatalities in other settings than ours; by prohibiting it, the government does not have to pay widows in case of accidents that occur when their husbands fish alone) unless one obtains a special permit that is very costly and hardly any fisherman possesses.
At the lake, fishermen sometimes take their wife or children to go fishing with them. However, very few fishermen go fishing with nonfamily members, and if they do, typically not on a regular basis. The reason for working alone is that the fishing instruments can be handled by one person, and therefore it is economically not optimal to fish in teams and then divide the catch. Fishermen at the lake also use smaller boats that render it impossible to take more than one person with them.
Experimental Procedures and Instructions. Experimental procedures.
Fishermen from both societies took part in economic experiments with large monetary incentives (on average, fishermen earned substantially more than two typical daily incomes). The experiments were conducted in similar environments. The recruitment of the fishermen was done with the help of leaders who announced a university study for fishermen. We conducted the experiments in a central place, typically in a local school or public building. The experiments and surveys were conducted with each fisherman individually in a way that secured that participants could not observe the behavior or listen to the responses of other participants. If separate rooms were available, we conducted the experiments in these rooms; if not, we left sufficient space between participants.
In all experimental sessions, an experimenter explained the games individually to the participants. The experimenters typically spent between 40 min and 1 h per participant explaining the games, administering the surveys, and so forth. After participants played all games, they had to wait for their payment. Participants were paid privately, and were not allowed to talk to other participants about the games until the end of the experimental session. We told them that if we found out that they talked to others, they would lose all of their earned money. We did not have to exclude any participant from the payment for this reason. The experimenters were local students with experience in conducting interviews. In addition, all experimenters were trained by us before they conducted the experiments and surveys. We had five experimenters in total. Four of these experimenters conducted the experiments in both societies.
At the beginning of the experiments all participants received a code to ensure anonymity. All games were played anonymously and only once. No participant knew the identity of his partner. Participants were not informed of their earnings until all experiments had ended. Before the games were played, a short survey was administered to collect socioeconomic data. No written instructions were used because many participants were illiterate.
A total of 458 subjects participated in our experiments. The individual competition experiments with fishermen (and the riskaversion experiments) were conducted 2008 with 289 subjects coming from eight societies at the lake (participants in sessions: n = 30, 19, 28, 29, 15, 19, 34, 17) and three societies at the sea (participants in sessions: n = 20, 38, 40). The individual competition experiments with women who do not fish were conducted 2012 with 66 subjects, as well as the group competition experiments with fishermen that were conducted with 103 subjects. The experiments were conducted in three societies at the lake (the same societies that we visited in 2008) and in two societies at the sea (we visited one of these two societies in 2008).
In the 2008 sessions, fishermen took part in five games (charity game, risk-aversion game, public-goods game, coordination game, and individual competition game). The experiments were always conducted in this order. To avoid income effects, only two of the five experiments were paid out. The participants drew two cards from a set of five cards after they played all five games to determine which games would be counted toward payment. In the 2012 sessions, women took part in four experiments (charity game, individual competition game, and two risk games). To avoid income effects, only two of the four experiments were paid out. Fishermen in 2012 took part in five experiments (group competition game and four risk games, always in the same order). To avoid income effects, only two of the five experiments were paid out. More information on the other experiments and findings are available upon request. Experimental instructions. These instructions were for both societies and are translated from the Portuguese.
General instructions. Thank you for coming to today's meeting. Please note that you are free to leave this meeting at any point of time. Today's meeting starts with a short survey and then there will be several games. Thereafter, there will be another short survey. During the games, you will have the chance to earn money. The money you earn will be paid out at the end of the meeting when you will determine, by drawing cards, which two games will become payoff-relevant. No one other than me will know what you earn today. The payment will be private. You should know that the money comes from research funds and not from our own pockets or from the pocket of politicians. Please note that there is no right or wrong in playing the games; this is not a test. During today's session you will receive a code. This ensures that everything you do-your decisions in the games and your answers in questionnaires-will remain anonymous.
Risk-aversion experiment. I will now give you 10 points. They are yours. If this game is selected for payment, it would mean that you get 10 Reais. You can play with these points; however, playing is risky: you can multiply these points or lose them. This depends on this coin. You will throw this coin and choose heads or tails. If you choose heads and heads shows up, the points you decided to play with are multiplied by 2.5. If you choose heads and tails shows up, you will lose all of the points with which you decided to play. You can decide not to play or to play with 1-10 points. Let me give you an example: I decide to play with 5 points, which means that I have 5 points for certain. Then I will choose heads or tails, and afterward I will throw the coin. If I choose heads and tails shows up, I will only receive 5 points. In contrast, if heads shows up, I will receive 5 × 2.5 = 12.5 points + 5 points = 17.5 points. Do you understand? How many points do you want to risk?
Individual competition experiment (adapted from ref. 4) . The goal of this game is to throw this tennis ball into the bucket. You have 10 tries. There are two options of how you can earn money in this task:
Option 1: For each ball that enters the bucket and stays in it, you will get 1 point. Option 2: You will play against another fisherman in this meeting but you do not know who. The fisherman who enters more balls in the bucket is the winner. Only the winner gets paid. He gets 3 points for each ball that enters the bucket, the loser gets nothing. In the case that you and the other fisherman enter the same amount of balls in the bucket, there is no winner and both of you get 1 point for each ball entered.
If this game is selected for payment, you will get one Real for each point.
Which option do you choose? Group competition experiment. The goal of this game is to throw this tennis ball into the bucket. You play this game with one other fisherman in this meeting. You do not know who this fisherman is, and neither does the other fishermen know who you are. Both of you have five tries. There are two options of how you can earn money in this task:
Option 1: For each ball that you and your partner enter into the bucket and stays in it, you will get 1 point.
Option 2: You will play against another pair of two fishermen from this meeting (but you do not know who this pair is). If you and your partner enter more balls in the bucket than the other pair you will get 3 points for each ball that enters the bucket. If you and your partner enter less balls in the bucket than the other pair you will get nothing. In the case that both pairs enter the same amount of balls in the bucket you will get 1 point for each ball entered.
Note that your decision in this game does not affect the way in which your partner is paid. Neither does it affect the way in which the fishermen in the other pair are paid. For example, if you decide option 2 and your partner option 1, then you will be only paid if your pair has more successful attempts than the other pair but your partner will receive 1 point for each successful attempt regardless of the relative performance.
Which option do you choose?
SI Data
This second section is divided into two parts. First, we present additional information on the demographic and economic variables of our subjects. Next, we presenting supporting evidence that the behavioral differences between our societies are robust and relate our study to two other studies.
Demographic and Economic Variables. Table S1 provides summary statistics for the demographic and economic variables in both societies that were collected in the 2008 surveys. This table presents summary statistics in means for each society. The lake societies are denoted L1-L8, and the sea societies are donated S1-S3. For example, we can see that the mean level of education (i.e., schooling in years) is generally low in all societies (2.7-4.3 y) and that fishermen are mildly religious (0.9-1.9) on a scale from 0 (not religious) to 4 (very religious). The vast majority is Roman Catholic. The variable income specifies the monthly income generated from fishing. The mean income is similar across societies (lake: 252.7, sea: 239.9 Brazilian Reais; Mann-Whitney U test, z = 0.359, P = 0.720, two sided, n = 289). Note that fishermen in general have few private possessions. We did not get the impression that there are significant differences in terms of wealth between fishermen across societies.
Table S1 also shows that the mean age of the participants varies between societies from 35 to 41.5 y. Overall, the subject pool is marginally older at the sea (Mann-Whitney U test, z = 1.853, P = 0.064, two sided, n = 289), which also translates into significant differences in experience (years fishing professionally) and years living in the same place. There is also a considerable fraction of women fishing in some lake societies, whereas the fraction of women fishing at the sea is close to zero. Note that there are no significant sex differences in the willingness to compete in our sample (P > 0.269). However, one may still wonder whether lake fishermen are more likely to compete than sea fishermen because there are more female participants in the lake sessions. We find that this is not the case. Men's willingness to compete is very similar and even slightly more pronounced in the four lake societies where there are few women (50.6%, n ≤ 2 women per society) compared with the four societies where there is a considerable fraction of women (46.7%, n ≥ 6 women per society). In any case, as shown in the next section, our results are robust after controlling for these variables.
Robustness Checks and Relation to Other Studies. Fig. S5 complements Fig. 2 in the manuscript and illustrates, besides the linear fit for competitiveness in the individualistic and collectivistic societies, the quadratic fit and a locally smoothed line from a Kernel regression. We observe few differences between these three estimations, suggesting that nonlinear effects are rather minor and that the linear regression model is appropriate.
In addition, we find that the large society difference in competitiveness is not subject to outlier societies. Competitiveness is low in all three societies at the sea (the means on society level are 20%, 26%, and 33%) and higher in seven of the eight societies at the lake (the means on society level are 23%, 42%, 43%, 45%, 47%, 47%, 56%, and 71%). Table S2 provides six Probit models in which we regress the decision in the individual competition experiment on the society (variable: sea dummy), and its interaction with job experience (variable: seniority). Model 1 shows that the sea dummy variable is highly negatively significant, showing that individual competitiveness is less pronounced in the collectivistic society (P = 0.002). The model also shows that seniority as a variable has no overall impact on competitiveness. Model 2 shows that the seniority variable is significantly predicting competitiveness at the lake (P = 0.045), and that the interaction between the sea dummy and seniority variables is negatively significant at P = 0.019 (reported in the main text). Models 3 and 4 are the equivalents of models 1 and 2 but control for individual risk-aversion (measured by the choice in the lottery experiment), task proficiency (how many successful attempts the individual had in the competition experiment), hours fishing per week, income generated from fishing, education, sex, and religiosity. We observe that the findings in models 1 and 2 are hardly affected by these controls. For example, the interaction between the sea dummy and seniority variables is still significant at P = 0.019 in model 4. We can also see that none of the control variables besides income is significantly related to competitiveness. Income as a variable is positively related to competitiveness in models 3 and 4 at P < 0.006, suggesting that the correlation between income and competitiveness as variables that we reported in the main text is robust.
Two recent related studies (5, 6) investigate competitiveness across life span. Interestingly, the studies reach different conclusions. Mayr et al. (5) observe that competitiveness for women and men is highest around the 50s, whereas Flory et al. (6) observe that men's competitiveness is constant across age groups and women's competitiveness increases with age. Although the focus of this study is on work experience and not age, we still observe interesting findings for the competitiveness variable: age relationships that square well with both previous studies. First, we observe, similar to Mayr et al. (5) , that competitiveness peaks around the 50s, but only for men. For women, we find similar to Flory et al. (6) that competitiveness tends to increase with age.
Model 5 in Table S2 is identical to model 4 but controls for the variable age. Although age and seniority are highly correlated (r = 0.7227, P < 0.0001, n = 289), we can nevertheless observe in this model that seniority is driving the society difference in competitiveness and not age. Seniority (P = 0.010) and the interaction between the sea dummy and seniority (P = 0.022) are highly significant after controlling for age.
Balafoutas et al. (7) find interesting relationships between different social preferences (such as spitefulness and efficiency concerns) and competitiveness. To investigate whether our findings are robust after controlling for social preferences, we use the behavior in the other experiments measuring cooperativeness in which the fishermen took part and control for them in model 6 of Table S2 . We observe that cooperativeness in these experiments is not significantly related to competitiveness (P = 0.115) and that seniority (P = 0.011) and the interaction between the sea dummy and seniority variables (P = 0.022) are highly significant after controlling for cooperativeness. Table S3 provides further robustness checks. Models 1 and 2 use different specifications of job experience. So far, we have used as a measure for seniority how many years participants have fished professionally. Although this is the most direct measure, there are other alternative measures that may capture seniority similarly well. In particular, one may argue that the influence of the work society on competitiveness is particularly strong in the first years of fishing and less pronounced in later years. To capture this idea, we take the log of seniority and use log seniority instead of seniority in model 1. We find that the patterns of findings are very similar and that the previous findings tend to be even more pronounced. The interaction sea dummy × log seniority and the variable log seniority are significant at the 1% level.
Another possibility to capture seniority is to take into account the fishing intensity and years fishing. Although our sample consists of professional fishermen who generate their main income from fishing, there are differences in how many hours they work per week. In model 2 of Table S3 , we construct a new measure for seniority (seniority 2), which is a combination of hours worked per week and years fishing. More precisely, we divided the hours worked per week by 24.7 (i.e., the mean hours worked per week in this sample), multiply it by 52 (i.e., the weeks per year) and the years worked. This measure roughly indicates how many weeks full-time fishermen have worked in their lives. We find that this variable, as well as the interaction with the sea dummy variable, are significant at P < 0.028.
Model 3 in Table S3 restricts our sample to fishermen who have started fishing in the society where they were living when we conducted the study (84.4%). We observe very similar, if not even sharper, data patterns in this restricted sample. The interaction term sea dummy × seniority and the variable seniority have significantly larger coefficients than in Table S2 and both are now significant at P < 0.0052 despite the smaller sample. Thus, this analysis rules out that selection into societies can account for the observed data patterns. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. Dependent variable was competitiveness. The coefficients are presented in average marginal effects. Robust SEs are used. Competitiveness = 1 if participant chose to compete in the competition experiment, 0 otherwise. Sea dummy = 1 if participant fishes at the sea, 0 otherwise. Seniority = years professional fishing. Risk aversion = points invested in the risk aversion experiment. Task proficiency = Number of successes in competition experiment (0-10). Hours fishing = hours fishing per week. Income = income generated from fishing. Education = years of schooling. Male dummy = 1 if participant is male, 0 otherwise. Religiosity measured on 5-point Likert scale. Age = age of participants. Cooperativeness = Index (0-100) for cooperativeness generated from equally weighted behavior in four experimental games (backtransfers in trust game, offers in ultimatum game, donations in charity game, contributions in public goods game). ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. The coefficients are presented in average marginal effects. Robust SEs are used. Dependent variable: Competitiveness = 1 if participant chose to compete in the competition experiment, 0 otherwise. Independent variables: Sea Dummy = 1 if participant fishes at the sea, 0 otherwise. Seniority = years professional fishing. Log seniority = log of years professional fishing. Seniority 2 = (hours worked per week/24.7) × 52 × years professional fishing. Age = age of participants. Risk aversion = points invested in the risk aversion experiment. Task proficiency = Number of successes in competition experiment (0-10). Hours fishing = hours fishing per week. Income = income generated from fishing. Education = years of schooling. Male dummy = 1 if participant is male, 0 otherwise. Religiosity measured on 5-point Likert scale.
